first strand of the reference the timetabling of this project may be more problematic. Double jeopardy was subject to review by the Law Commission in England following a reference from the Home Secretary on 2 July 1999. The Law Commission reported in January 2001, 34 with publication two months later. Twenty months from reference to publication is as long as (or longer than) the timetable that appears to have been given to the Commission to report on double jeopardy in Scots law. At the time when this project was being completed by the Law Commission there were five full-time members of the Government Legal Service, three research assistants, and the Chairman of the Commission working on criminal law projects. 35 By contrast, the Scottish Law Commission has two Commissioners (the part-time chairman, Lord Drummond Young, and Professor Maher), 36 one full-time member of the legal service and two research assistants working on the World's End reference. This team of half the size is working to a similar timetable. While this may demonstrate a touching faith in the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of work within the Scottish Law Commission, it is important that those holding the purse strings realise that, if it is to work on time-pressured references as well as on other areas of social and legal importance, the Commission can only maintain the high quality of its recent work if it is properly resourced.
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The True Meaning of "Wicked Recklessness": HM
Advocate v Purcell
For at least forty years, English criminal lawyers have been remarkably concerned with a persistent, but thankfully hypothetical, insurance fraudster. This villain, the story runs, has some valuable cargo on board an aeroplane, on which he places a time-bomb, with the aim of collecting the insurance on his cargo. Should this bomb go off, the passengers and crew of the plane will inevitably die.
1
The difficulty here is that under English law, a person can only be guilty of murder if he intended either to kill or do grievous bodily harm.
2 The insurance fraudster, it is thought, certainly ought to be guilty of murder, but can he be said to intend to kill? Is he not simply indifferent to the fate of those on board the plane?
Haunted by hypotheticals such as this, 3 the history of "intention" in English criminal law has been a tortured one. 4 The current position seems to be that if death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty as a result of the defendant's action, and the defendant realised this was the case, the jury are "entitled to find" intention established.
5 This is, however, hardly satisfactory. In particular, if the jury is merely entitled (and not bound) to find intention established in such cases, how is it to decide whether or not to do so? 6 Scots lawyers have watched these debates with detached amusement. Because the mens rea of murder is different in this jurisdiction -constituted either by a wicked intention to kill or wicked recklessness 7 -the debate has been treated as irrelevant:
8 the insurance fraudster, it has been said, can be convicted on the basis that his actions demonstrate wicked recklessness. 9 English lawyers have sometimes used the insurance fraudster hypothetical in order to argue that the mens rea of murder in English law should be altered along the lines found in Scotland.
10
Thanks to a recent decision of the High Court, however -a decision reached in rather unusual circumstances -it seems that all this was wrong, and that the true meaning of "intention" is, in principle, just as important to the Scots law of murder as the English. The case is HM Advocate v Purcell.
11

A. PURCELL: FACTS AND PROCEDURE
The charge against Mr Purcell was that he had committed murder by driving a car so recklessly that he hit and killed a young boy. Such a charge is exceptional, because it is normally expected that a death resulting from the use of a motor vehicle -except, perhaps, where a vehicle has been used deliberately as a weapon 12 -will at most be charged as the statutory offence of causing death by dangerous driving.
13
This statutory offence derives from the offence of causing death by reckless or dangerous driving, introduced both north and south of the Border in 1956 because it was believed that "juries had been unwilling to convict of manslaughter in cases of death caused by car drivers".
14 As recently as 1983, it was judicially suggested that a prosecution for manslaughter as a result of reckless driving would only be brought "in a very grave case", 15 and in 2001 Michael Christie wrote that prosecutions for culpable homicide by grossly negligent driving were in a "process of disappearing" now that the penalty for causing death by dangerous driving was a maximum of ten years' imprisonment. 16 Against that background, the murder charge against Mr Purcell was wholly exceptional, but then his conduct was extreme: in eventually sentencing him to twelve years' imprisonment for culpable homicide, Lord Uist said that the "course of wild and reckless driving in which you engaged before, during and after this fatal accident was wholly atrocious in nature and placed the lives of everyone in your wake in serious danger".
17
For whatever reason, Mr Purcell's counsel did not take a plea to the relevancy of the charge against him, 18 or even a statutory submission of no case to answer, but instead chose to submit after both the Crown and defence evidence had been led that there was no basis on which the jury could return a verdict of guilt of murder.
19
This procedure was technically competent but wholly undesirable. Nothing turned on the evidence which had been led in court: counsel's submission was simply that some form of "wilful act" (probably an assault) was required as a basis for a conviction of murder, and no such act had been alleged in the indictment.
It is, for obvious reasons, undesirable to have to deal with complex submissions of law after a jury has been empanelled. 20 Had counsel's submission been raised as a preliminary plea, 21 there would have been no question of impeding the proper course of a jury trial: instead, the matter could have been decided by a single judge and an refuse to entertain counsel's submission on the basis that it was in substance a preliminary plea in terms appeal taken if necessary. As it was, the trial judge was put in the unenviable position of being asked to determine the correct answer to a hugely important but uncertain legal question. Perhaps mindful of the media and parliamentary storm which had surrounded the recent decision of another judge, sitting alone, to uphold a no case to answer submission in another high profile murder trial, 22 Lord Uist decided that the issue should be dealt with by a bench of three judges, which was promptly convened.
This approach -almost certainly the least worst option available -may seem to replicate an appeal court hearing, but it has significant disadvantages. In particular, appellate courts are more likely to produce "correct" decisions not just because of the increased number of judges sitting on them, but because of the opportunities for refinement of argument: they have a previous reasoned decision to consider and counsel can reconsider and refine their arguments on the basis of that decision. 23 As it was, the opinion of the court, while careful and thoughtful, is open to criticisms which might have been avoided had a different procedure been followed at the outset.
B. PURCELL: THE DECISION
In summary, the decision in Purcell is clear and simple: murder requires that death be caused either "with wicked intention to kill or by an act intended to cause physical injury and displaying a wicked disregard of fatal consequences". 24 Scots law can no longer rely on wicked recklessness to sidestep the problem of "intention". There are two obvious problems with this approach, however.
25
First, a problem of doctrine: the decision is not as easily reconciled with precedent as the Purcell court seems to think. Although the review of the authorities conducted by Lord Eassie is careful and thorough, there is one surprising omission: the decision of a court of seven judges in Brennan v HM Advocate.
26 There, the court rejected an argument that a person who had suffered a "total alienation of reason" as a result of voluntary intoxication could be acquitted of murder. The court's reasoning appears to have been as follows: even if Brennan had been so drunk as to be incapable of forming any intention, becoming grossly intoxicated was itself wickedly reckless. 27 It is not easy to see how this approach can be reconciled with the decision in Purcell. 
